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Introduction
In the last 15 years, many Latin American countries have implemented non-contributory (NC) pension programs for the elderly, spending on average 0.56 percent of GDP on them (Levy and Schady, 2013) . These NC pensions, which are typically conditioned on age and residence requirements, attempt to reduce elderly poverty by distributing resources to the large proportion of seniors who do not qualify for a contributory pension. 1 Mexico has been no exception to this trend. Since 2001, several Mexican states, starting with the Federal District (DF), have gradually implemented their own NC pension programs in which eligible individuals receive a monthly cash transfer that is almost exclusively conditioned on age and state residence. By 2011, 16 of the 32 states had implemented such local programs (Aguila et al., 2011) . On top of these local pension programs, in 2007 the federal government started its own: the 70 y Más program. The latter initially paid about 40 USD per month to individuals age 70 and older residing in localities with up to 2,500 inhabitants-the smallest in the country.
2 This federal program was implemented with the explicit purpose of increasing the income of beneficiaries, and its rollout responded to the particularly low coverage of the contribution-based Mexican pension systems in rural areas. 3 The program grew rapidly and was expanded to larger localities in the early years, reaching national coverage in 2012.
A potential concern with the increasing popularity of these pension schemes is that they might lead to a decrease in saving because they provide a substitute for contribution-based pensions, reduce the need for precautionary savings among the elderly and facilitate increases in
consumption. An increase in the consumption of the elderly is not necessarily undesirable.
However, by changing the expectations of younger individuals, NC pension programs might alter their overall saving patterns and investments in human and physical capital.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the potential effects of NC pension programs on the saving patterns of Mexican households. Specifically, we estimate how the combination of the 70 y Más program with state-level NC pensions affected saving rates using micro data from the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the geographical rollout of the 70 y Más program, together with the variation in the start of the state programs. We conduct the analysis for households whose oldest member is ageeligible, and also for different groups of households whose oldest member is younger than 70.
This approach yields a broader picture of the potential effects of NC pensions on saving and labor supply of their targeted population, and of individuals who are still young but might also respond to the incentives of such programs. This is relevant for several reasons. First, saving rates, which are an important element for the sustained growth that Mexico longs for, continue to be low in the country (around 24 percent of GDP according to Levy and Schady, 2013) , and they could be further diminished by the ongoing expansion of these NC pensions programs. Second, state and federal programs add up to a significant amount of resources that are being transferred to the Mexican elderly. These resources can only be expected to increase in the near future. 4 In fact, the current administration just lowered the eligibility age of the federal NC pension to 65 upon taking office, and the Mexican Congress has yet to discuss a reform that would double the pension amount and make it a permanent component of the Mexican social insurance system. In this context, it is even more relevant to shed some light on the potential effects that these programs have on the saving decisions of those individuals who are close to the eligibility age, and of those younger ones who will face the new set of rules. Third, to our knowledge, the literature on NC pensions in Mexico has not directly looked at the effects on the amount and composition of savings. This literature has estimated either the effect of the DF pension program or that of the 70 y Más program on the labor supply of beneficiaries and younger individuals who live with them (Juarez, 2010; Juarez and Pfutze, 2013; Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) , on the crowding out of the private transfers that beneficiaries receive (Juarez, 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013) , or on the mental health of beneficiaries (Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) .
Two papers find a positive effect of the 70 y Más program on household expenditures, but none of them looks at either the amount or composition of saving (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013; Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) . Our study intends to fill the aforementioned gap in the literature, and to be the first one to inform about the combined impact of the federal and statelevel pension programs.
Our results reveal that the federal NC pension program by itself is associated with a reduction in the saving rate of two groups of households: those whose oldest member is either age 18 to 54 or 65 to 69 years old. The effects for both groups are quite robust across different saving definitions and identification and empirical checks. State NC programs by themselves have no significant effects on the saving rate of households in the smallest localities in Mexico, which were the first ones incorporated into the federal program, but we find some evidence of them reducing the saving of households with members in their sixties in larger localities. Finally, we find that, overall, the effects of the combination of the federal and state NC pension programs on the saving rate of households are mostly not statistically significant, which might be explained in part by each program having an effect on the saving of households in different population strata. No significant effects are found for households whose oldest member is ageeligible (70 and older), probably because the saving of this households is already low to begin with given their age.
A potential explanation for these findings is that: i) older households about to become eligible for the program decrease their saving rate precisely because they expect to receive the NC pension in a few years, and ii) younger households perceive a diminished need to transfer private resources to their elderly, who will now qualify for a NC pension. Regarding the latter explanation, these programs might allow younger households to reduce their private support and have more income left to consume. Indeed, previous evidence for Mexico shows a significant crowding-out effect of such programs on the transfers the elderly receive from other, presumably younger, households (Juarez, 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013) . In addition, these programs might reduce the longevity risk associated with elderly family members that do not qualify for a pension, thus also reducing also the need for precautionary savings among younger households.
We perform a series of identification and robustness checks to validate our main results, and they remain mostly unchanged. In addition, we present estimates of the effect of NC pensions on selected saving categories. We find increases in human capital investment induced by these programs in some age groups, likely reflecting increases in education investment among the relatively young and increases in health-related expenditures among the elderly. Positive impacts are also found for investment in durable and financial goods. Finally, to better understand our findings, we conclude the analysis with some evidence of labor supply responses at the household level.
Background

Population Aging in Mexico
Although Mexico is still a relatively young country, it is experiencing an accelerated population aging process, due mainly to a steady increase in the life expectancy and a decrease in the number of births per woman. Figure 1 shows that 6 percent of the Mexican population was age 65 and older in 2010. As shown in the figure, a sustained increase in this percentage is expected in the following decades, until it reaches 16 percent in 2050. This is equivalent to a 2.7 times increase in the share of individuals age 65 and older in 40 years. A similar trend is observed for the percentage of the population age 70 and older, which is expected to grow from 4 percent in 2010 to 11 percent in 2050. The figure also highlights another well-known fact: due to the greater longevity of women, they are disproportionally represented among the elderly population, especially the oldest individuals.
Such a quick and steep increase in the relative importance of elderly individuals raises the need of adequately providing for them. Figure 2 emphasizes the challenge that the changes in the population age structure will pose for the future financial sustainability of both contributory and non-contributory pension systems. The anticipation of this change in the age structure of the population was probably one of the reasons behind the transition from a pay-as-you-go definedbenefit contributory pension scheme to a fully funded defined-contribution scheme in Mexico in 1997 and 2007. 5 However, as shown in the next section, the main challenge facing the current Mexican contributory pensions system continues to be low coverage and contribution rates, which result in a substantial share of individuals who do qualify for a pension when they reach retirement age. between those two years. In 2010, Mexico had a proportion of individuals age 65 and older similar to that of countries like Colombia, Dominican Republic and Peru, and lower than that of South American countries like Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. However, the percent increase in this proportion from 2010 to 2030 in Mexico will be on the order of 88 percent-one of the five largest among the group of Latin American countries. In sum, although population aging seems to be a common trend among middle-income countries in Latin America, Mexico stands out as one of the countries likely to be hit harder by this phenomenon.
Overview of the Mexican Contributory Pension System
The contributory pension system currently operating in Mexico is primarily composed of two public institutes: the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) for salaried employees in the private sector, and the Institute of Health and Social Security for Government Employees (ISSSTE) for federal employees. 6 These two institutes are mostly funded by employer and employee wage-based contributions which, together with a government social contribution, are deposited into individual saving accounts. 7 According to the law, only salaried workers are required to save for their retirement through these institutes. Other types of workers, like the selfemployed, are allowed to voluntarily participate in IMSS. However, in practice, only few of them do.
To qualify for a pension from IMSS, which as shown below is the main provider of this type of pensions, the worker must be at least 60 or 65 years old, depending on the type of pension, and have contributed for at least 1,250 weeks (approximately 25 years). 8 After the 2007 reform, the eligibility rules for ISSSTE are the same. For both institutes, the amount of the pension granted is a function of the funds accumulated in the worker's individual account. If 6 The military and employees of Pemex, the national public oil company, and of state local governments are covered through their own social security institutes. Employer-provided private pension plans are very limited, and they are provided only to a small fraction of workers in addition to, and not in place of, IMSS coverage (Aguila et al., 2011) . 7 These accounts are administered by private pension funds called AFOREs (by their Spanish acronym), and the worker can choose between them. This aspect was also part of the 1997 IMSS and 2007 ISSSTE reforms. 8 IMSS provides two types of pensions for the elderly: i) severance at advanced age pension (Cesantía en Edad Avanzada in Spanish) and ii) old-age pension (Pensión de Vejez). To be eligible for the first one, the worker must be at least 60 years old, have at least 1,250 contribution weeks, and have no job. At age 60, this pension pays 75 percent of the old-age one, with the percentage increasing with each year of age until reaching 100 percent at age 65. For the second one, the requirements are a minimum age of 65 and the same number of contribution weeks.
those funds are not enough, the government guarantees a minimum pension equal to 1 monthly minimum wage (MW) in the case of IMSS, and 1.5 monthly MW in the case of ISSSTE. percent receive a pension equivalent to 2 or less monthly MW, whereas only 20 percent of ISSSTE and 17 percent of other pensioners do.
As explained above, eligibility for a contributory pension and the amount of the pension granted depend on the amount contributed by the worker over her lifetime. In Table 2 , we present some approximate calculations on the proportion of workers that contribute to IMSS, using different sources of data listed at the bottom of the (2008) , a substantial share of the working-age population is not being legally forced to save for 9 The minimum wage that is used explicitly as a reference for the minimum guaranteed pension in the IMSS law is the one applicable in Distrito Federal (DF), the capital of Mexico. In the 2007 ISSSTE law, the minimum pension is specified as 3,034.20 Mexican pesos, which is equivalent to 1.5 times the DF MW in that year, and it is annually updated according to the inflation in the consumer price index. 10 Table 3 
Related Literature
The Impact of Social Programs on Private Saving
For quite some time, economists and policymakers have been concerned about the potential impact that social programs might have on individuals' incentives to save. Individuals save in order to finance future consumption, with one of the primary reasons for saving being building a nest egg for retirement. 19 In that regard, programs like Social Security in the United States are likely to reduce the incentive to save by providing seniors with a monthly paycheck from the government. The negative impact of Social Security on saving has been confirmed by many scholars (e.g., Leimer and Richardson, 1992; Engen and Gale, 1996; Feldstein, 1996) . And, likewise, it has been shown that countries that have either privatized their retirement programs or never offered one, as in the case of Chile and Singapore, respectively, have enjoyed high private saving rates (Marcel and Arenas, 1992; Ferrara, Goodman and Matthews, 1995) .
Nevertheless, as noted by Poterba (1996) , the main issue with the empirical literature has been identification. To the extent that cross-sectional variation in Social Security stems from lifetime income, which is tied to an individual's work history and, therefore, to her non-Social Security savings, it becomes rather difficult to isolate the impact of Social Security on savings.
Furthermore, to the extent that individuals of the same age will have similar Social Security benefit schedules, it is hard to get the needed variation in Social Security benefits across similar households.
The Effects of Non-Contributory Pensions
What do we know about the impact of NC pensions on savings? Previous empirical studies for Focusing on Mexico, in particular, the literature has primarily concentrated on assessing the effect of the DF pension program or that of the 70 y Más program on the labor supply of beneficiaries and younger individuals who live with them (Juarez, 2010; Juarez and Pfutze, 2013; Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) , on the crowding-out of the private transfers that beneficiaries receive (Juarez 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013) , or on the mental health of beneficiaries (Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) . Two papers find a positive effect of the 70 y Más program on household expenditures, but none of them looks at either the impact on the amount or composition of savings (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013; Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) . With this study, we aim to address this gap in the literature by examining how NC federal and state programs have impacted household savings and their composition. We exploit the geographic and temporal variation inherent in the rollout of these programs to isolate the impact that NC pensions might have on private savings.
Data
We use the harmonized waves of the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey (Encuesta The second measure of saving adds in-kind income (in-kind labor payments, transfers and gifts) and consumption (own consumption and the estimated rent for homeowners) to the monetary measures described above. Including in-kind items has the advantage of taking into account sources of income and consumption that are important for certain households, like own consumption for rural households. However, a potential disadvantage is that in-kind items are subjectively valued in the ENIGH survey.
The third measure of saving is monetary income minus monetary consumption of nondurables. For this measure, we exclude from consumption those categories that represent other forms of saving, like investment in human capital (health and education), housing and real estate, and purchases of durable goods (electronics, machinery, vehicles) . 20 For all three definitions, we focus on saving rates, i.e., the difference between income and consumption, divided by the corresponding income measure. 20 In a previous study of overall household saving patterns in Mexico, Attanasio and Székely (1998) also use the second and third measure of saving and ENIGH data for the period 1984-1996.
Additionally, we look separately at several components of saving as investment in human capital (education and health), durables, real estate and financial assets (the sum of bank deposits, loans to others, and net purchases of stocks, bonds, and other financial market investment instruments). For these components, we also compute the saving rate with respect to household income.
The ENIGH data do not have locality identifiers or size, but divides the sample in four different strata according to locality size: localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants (stratum 4), localities with 2,500-14,999 inhabitants (stratum 3), localities with 15,000-99,999 inhabitants (stratum 2) and localities with 100,000 or more inhabitants (stratum 1). We will use this classification for both our descriptive analysis and estimation, as the 70 y Más program was rolled out according to locality size. The fact that most of overall mean saving rates in the top panel of Table 4 are negative is probably due to the presence of large negative outliers. This is confirmed by the fact that, as shown in the bottom panel, median saving rates are mostly positive. Median saving rates when including in-kind items in income and consumption are the lowest (ranging between 2.5 and 9 percent of income), followed by those obtained when using only monetary variables (ranging between 8 and 14 percent of income). The median saving rates that include in-kind items are roughly comparable to those reported by Attanasio and Székely (1998) , who also use the ENIGH data for the period 1984-1996. 22 Median saving rates when excluding the consumption of durables are the largest, ranging between 14 to 22 percent of income. Because most saving is done by a small fraction of the population, the median saving rates for the various components are equal to zero, with the exception of savings in human capital, which ranges between half a percent and 5 percent of household income over the period. Overall, the median saving rate computed from adding up these components fluctuates between 2.6 percent and 7 percent for the 2000-2012 period.
Descriptive Evidence
Summary Statistics by Year
In sum, for the most part, median saving rates did not change much over 
Graphical Analysis of Saving Trends
We next graphically depict median saving rates over time, according to a variety of household level descriptors, including locality size; age and educational attainment of the household head;
and by household monetary income deciles. For the sake of brevity, we display the figures for 21 The only atypical value of housing investment during the whole period is that corresponding to 2008 (equal to 16 percent). We ignore this atypical value in this descriptive discussion. 22 For that period, Attanasio and Székely (1998) rates by locality size, we see that the two tend to be positively correlated. Consistently, during the period 2000-2012, households in the largest localities in the country-those with more than 100,000 inhabitants-had the highest saving rates, whereas households in the smallest localities-those with less than 2,500 inhabitants-had the lowest ones. In addition, the gap in median saving rates between these two groups of households increased over time. In 2000, the difference in the median saving rate between the largest (9.7 percent) and the smallest localities When we look at median saving rates according to the age of the household head, we find that the three youngest groups (12-45 years old) had median monetary saving rates that were below 10 percent, whereas those of older groups were between 10 and 23 percent. While differences in saving rates are relatively small among households with the eldest household heads, households whose heads are 56-65 years old had the highest median saving rates for most of the period (15-23 percent of income); followed by those with 66 to 70 years old heads (11-20 percent). Household whose heads were 81 years old or older had the lowest median saving rates among these older groups (7.5 to 13 percent) in most years. These patterns are broadly consistent with younger and elderly households having relatively lower saving rates when compared to households approaching retirement age (56-65 years old).
As one would expect, median saving rates also differed according to the educational attainment of the household head. We distinguish among households whose heads had no formal or only elementary education, those whose heads had a secondary education (middle high, high school and teacher's degree, called "normal"), and households whose heads had a tertiary education (college or more). Households whose heads had a secondary education or less had fairly similar saving rates between 2000 and 2008 that fluctuate between 8 and 12 percent.
During the same period, households whose heads were highly educated had significantly higher saving rates ranging between 13 and 23 percent. After 2008, the three education groups experienced a drop in saving, which was most pronounced for the highly educated group, followed by the group with a secondary education. This could be due to the financial crisis affecting high and mid-level education workers relatively more through financial losses and reduced employment in manufacturing.
Lastly, median saving rates also significantly differ by monetary income decile. The lowest saving rate corresponds to the poorest households (those in the first decile), whereas the highest saving rate corresponds to the richest households (those in the tenth decile). Between those extremes, households in each income decile saved more than those in the one right below them, but less than those in the one right above them. Therefore, the ordering of median saving rates matches that of income deciles. In 2000, the first decile had a negative median monetary saving rate (-11 percent), which decreased consistently in subsequent rounds and reached large In what follows, we control for the role played by these household level characteristics in explaining saving patterns, while paying special attention to how state-level and federal noncontributory pension plans might have altered household saving rates. As shown in In the above equation, the coefficient 1 captures the combined effect of the federal and state-level NC pension programs on the saving rate of households. The coefficients 2 and 3 capture the separate impacts of the state and federal NC pension programs, respectively.
Main Results
Do NC pension programs lower household saving rates? Table 5 and Table 6 address this question using various measures of household saving. Table 5 shows the results when defining saving as either: i) the difference between monetary income and expenditures (Panel A), ii) the difference between income and expenditures when we include in-kind items in both (Panel B), and iii) the difference between monetary income and expenditures when we only include nondurable goods in the latter (Panel C). In each of the three panels, the first row shows the combined effect of being in a locality and state where both NC programs operate, whereas the second row shows the effect of the federal NC program alone, and the third row displays the impact of the state NC program.
For most age groups, the coefficients on the combined impact of the state and federal NC programs are generally negative, but not statistically different from zero. Only households whose oldest member is 65 to 69 years old report saving increases of approximately 14 percentage points when we look at the first measure of monetary saving, but the effect is never present for the alternative measures of saving.
Most of the impact of NC pension programs on household saving originates from the federal NC pension program. In particular, for all three measures of saving discussed above, households whose oldest member is 65 to 69 years old appear to significantly curtail their saving rate anywhere between 8 and 12 percentage points. In addition, the federal NC pension program also appears to reduce monetary, as well as monetary plus in-kind saving of households whose oldest member is 18 to 54 years old by approximately 4 percentage points. Finally, the federal NC pension program also lowers monetary plus in-kind saving of households eligible for these programs, i.e., those whose oldest adult is age 70 and older, by approximately 7 percentage points, but only significant at 10 percent.
Do state NC programs have any impact on household saving? The evidence here is significantly weaker, with sporadic impacts on different households depending on the measure of saving being used. For example, when we restrict our attention to monetary saving, the state NC pension programs appear to reduce the saving of households whose oldest member is 60 to 64 years old only. If we add to the monetary measure of saving in-kind items, we find that the state NC pension programs lower the saving rates of younger households whose oldest member is 18 to 54 years old by roughly 5 percentage points. Lastly, using the broadest measure of saving, which adds non-durable items to monetary plus in-kind saving, state NC pension programs curtail saving by households whose oldest member is 65 to 69 years old by 4 percentage points, although this effect is significant at 10 percent only.
In sum, according to our results, it is the federal NC pension program that appears to have had a more consistent impact on the saving of two groups of households, in particular: i) younger households, whose oldest member is 18 to 54 years old, and ii) older households nearing the eligibility age for the NC pension programs. A potential explanation for the lower saving rates of younger households is the lesser need to save to support age-eligible parents or close relatives to whom they would transfer resources in the absence of a federal NC pension program. In this vein, previous studies for Mexico have found a significant crowding out of such private transfers, after the implementation of state NC pension in DF (Juarez, 2009 ) and the 70 y Más federal program (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013). These crowding out estimates range from 30 to 80 percent, which implies that a significant fraction of resources of the NC programs could be redistributed to younger households, potentially increasing their current income and decreasing their saving rate. In addition, these programs might reduce the longevity risk coming from their uncovered elderly relatives by providing a public transfer to them for the rest of their lives, thus also reducing the need for precautionary savings. The impact of the federal NC pension program on the saving of households whose oldest member is close to reaching eligibility (age 60-69) fits well with the literature on precautionary savings.
Identification Tests
The validity of the interpretation given to the estimates in Table 5 rests on the assumption that differences in saving rates between households exposed to state and/or federal NC programs and similar unexposed households are not pre-existent. To assess whether that was indeed the case, we construct a lead dummy for the year preceding the implementation of the NC program in our data. 25 We then interact that lead dummy with both the state and federal NC program dummies, and include those interaction terms in the estimation of equation (1). If there were pre-existing trends driving the NC program impacts observed herein, we would expect these placebo interaction terms to produce statistically significant coefficients in the same direction of the effects discussed above. The results of this test are shown in Table 6 . Because the results in Table 5 using the three different measures of saving are similar, we focus our attention on the first measure of monetary saving.
The negative impact of the federal NC program in either younger households (those whose oldest member is 18 to 54 years old) and older households (those whose oldest member is nearing the eligibility age, i.e. 65 to 69 years old) remains, even though it becomes significant at 10 percent only for the older group, with no statistically significant placebo interaction terms. It is also reassuring that the point estimates are similar to the ones in Table 5 despite the inclusion 25 Because our data refer to 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012, if of the placebo interaction terms. In sum, the negative impact of the federal NC program on the saving of younger and older households nearing the eligibility age for the 70 y Más program in Table 5 does not appear to be the byproduct of a pre-existing difference in saving between treated and non-treated households.
Robustness Checks
In addition to the identification tests in the previous section, we perform an additional empirical check to assess the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of locality strata for estimation.
Specifically, we re-estimate equation (1) using households in all locality strata, instead of using only those in strata 1 and 4. We redefine our federal NC pension program variable to be equal to 1 for each locality stratum after such stratum was incorporated into the program (see Table A in the Appendix). We present the results of this exercise in Table 7 . According to the estimates in Table 7 , monetary saving in households whose oldest member is 65 to 69 years of age continues to significantly drop by approximately 9.4 percentage points due to the implementation of the federal NC program. A drop of 2.7 percentage points is observed for the saving of households whose oldest member is 18 to 54 years old, due to the same program. Both estimates are a bit smaller, but similar in magnitude to those obtained in Table 5 when we restrict our sample to only households that were first treated (stratum 4) and never treated (stratum 1). In addition, including households in all population strata yields a negative effect of state NC pension programs of approximately 4.6 percentage points on the saving of households in the 60-64 and 65-69 age groups, suggesting that these programs might be reaching households in localities larger than 2,500 inhabitants.
We perform a similar estimation including all locality strata, but allowing the effect of federal and state NC pension programs to vary by stratum. Stratum 1 is the reference one.
Results are displayed in Table C in the Appendix. The most remarkable finding is that the effect of the federal NC program alone for households in the 65-69 and 18-54 age groups in stratum 4
are very similar to the effects captured in our main results (-0.129 and -0.036, respectively). The effects of state NC pension programs are negative and around 4.6-4.8 percentage points for households whose oldest member is in her sixties, and no significant variation across strata is found.
Understanding the Negative Impact of NC Pensions on Savings
The Impact of Non-Contributory Programs on Saving Components
The estimates, thus far, refer to aggregate household saving. A natural question is whether the observed impact of NC programs is due to their impact on a particular saving category. To answer that question, Table 8 displays the impact of the state and federal NC programs on investments in human capital, durable goods, real estate and financial assets. Of these, the first three categories are included as expenditures in our monetary saving definition, whereas financial investment is not. 26 Among households whose oldest member is age 18-54, federal NC programs seem to increase investments in human capital by approximately 2 percentage points.
A potential explanation for these positive effects is that the increase in income, due to a diminishing need for the transfer of resources to the elderly, might be partially reallocated to young individuals through an increase in education investments. A similar result is obtained for households in the 55-59 age group. The other groups of households whose investments in human capital are increased by the federal NC program are those whose oldest member is at least 65 years of age. Given their age, part of this increase among older households could reflect health investments. However, some of it might also come from increased investments in education of co-residing children, as suggested by Gutiérrez, Juarez and Rubli (2015) . 27 The combined impact of the federal and state NC program positively affects saving in human capital for households whose oldest member is 60 to 64 years old, but the opposite holds for those age 65 to 69, and no other impacts are found for other age groups.
The federal NC program also increases saving in durable assets by households whose oldest member is 18 to 54 years old and households nearing the program's eligibility age by roughly 1 and 2 percentage points, respectively. In the case of younger households, the interaction of both programs has a negative effect on the investment in durable goods, but the effect is marginally significant. The effects of a state NC program by itself are all close to zero and statistically insignificant. The positive effects of the federal NC pension program on both human capital and durables investment found for households in the 18-54 and 65-69 might explain why the effects on Table 5 in Panel C are smaller than those in Panel A. Indeed, as mentioned before, both categories are included as expenditures in the first saving definition but not in the third one. So, the decrease in monetary saving for these households reflects, in part, increased investment in human capital and durables.
Finally, state and federal NC programs appear to be associated with a 4 percentage point higher saving in real estate assets by households in the 65-69 age group, as well as with increases in financial saving of households in the 18-54 and 65-69 age groups of approximately 3 and 8 percentage points, respectively.
The Impact of Non-Contributory Programs on Labor Supply
To conclude, we also provide complementary evidence on a measure of household labor supply, a channel through which the impact of NC state-level programs might be taking place. To this end, Table 9 presents the estimated effect of federal and state NC pensions programs on the share of individuals age 16 and older in the household who are actually working. We include the same controls as in equation (1). In general, most of the effects of the federal NC pension program, and its interaction with the state-level one, are negative, but only three of them are statistically significant. The combination of state and federal NC pension programs has a negative impact on the labor supply of households whose oldest member is 65 to 69 years of age. For these households, the combined effect of both programs reaches -9.5 percentage points. This reduction could be due to an anticipation effect, but the literature so far has found no evidence of such an effect for individuals in their sixties (Juarez and Pfutze, 2013; Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) , so further analysis on who within these households is reducing her labor force participation seems due.
The federal NC pension program alone has a negative and significant effect on the share of working members in households in the 18-54 and 70 and older groups. The negative impact of 6.3 percentage points is in line with the reduction in labor force participation among beneficiaries found in some previous studies about the 70 y Más program (Juarez and Pfutze, 2013) . The effect for the younger group of households (-4 percentage points) has not been documented before. Previous studies find no effect on the labor supply of prime-age individuals who live with potential beneficiaries (Juarez and Pfutze, 2013; Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2012) . Note that, instead, our result in the first column in Table 9 refers to the share of working individuals in households whose oldest member is age 18-54, i.e., those with no potential beneficiaries. Thus, our result for the youngest group is not directly comparable to previous studies and could be also due to the increase in income caused by the reduced need to transfer resources to the elderly.
Finally, to the extent that the groups experiencing a largest reduction in saving are those experiencing a reduction in their labor supply, the decrease in saving caused by NC pensions could be working in part through an associated reduction in labor supply.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provide micro evidence on the effects of NC pension programs on the saving patterns of Mexican households. Our results show that the federal NC pension program by itself is associated with a reduction in the saving rate of households whose oldest member is either age 18 to 54 or 65 to 69 years old. The effect for both groups of households is quite robust across different saving definitions and identification and empirical checks. State NC programs by themselves have no significant effects in the saving rate of households in the smallest localities in Mexico, which were the first ones incorporated into the federal program, but we find some evidence of them reducing the saving of households with members in their sixties in larger localities. Finally, we find that, overall, the effects of the combination of the federal and state NC pension programs on the saving rate of households are mostly not statistically significant, which might be explained in part by each program having an effect on the saving of households in different population strata.
We find no significant impact of NC pension programs on the saving of households whose oldest member is age-eligible (70 and older), probably because the saving of these households is already low to begin with given their age.
The findings for households in the 65 to 69 group could reflect their expectation of receiving the transfer from the program in a few years. Younger households in the 18-59 age group-households that would be transferring private resources to their elderly in the absence of a NC program-might now able to reduce their support. The previous evidence for Mexico, which shows a significant crowding-out effect of such programs on the transfers the elderly receive from other households (Juarez, 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2013) supports this explanation. In addition, these programs might reduce the longevity risk associated with their elderly family members that do not qualify for a pension, thus also reducing their need for precautionary savings. In addition, we provide complementary evidence suggesting the reduction in saving is partly associated with reduction in labor supply for households in these two groups.
In sum, our findings suggest that NC pensions lowered the household saving of particular age groups during the first decade of their implementation, possibly through anticipation effects and a redistribution of income between households of different generations. These effects might become larger as these programs increase their pension amount and expand their coverage by decreasing the age eligibility cutoff. Finally, additional effects could be observed through other mechanisms and for other age groups as these programs become a more permanent component of the Mexican social insurance system. Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term along with household level characteristics (a dummy for female head, age and education of the household head, share of household members in different age and education group), dummies for state, stratum 4, and post 2007, the relevant interactions, and a linear trend. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level; no asterisk means the coefficient is not different from zero with a statistical significance. Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term along with household level characteristics (a dummy for female head, age and education of the household head, share of household members in different age and education group), dummies for state, stratum, the relevant interactions, and a linear trend. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level; no asterisk means the coefficient is not different from zero with a statistical significance.
